COR facilitates research on new organizational forms and processes now taking shape in a variety of contexts. As the 21st century unfolds, we increasingly find organizing that diverges from traditional bureaucratic structures. Such possibilities can be found in global teams, web-based collaboration, network structures, collective threats to security and privacy, micro enterprises, international non-governmental organizations, and alliances across private, public, and non-profit fields. These developments raise opportunities for alternative modes of decision-making, just as they present challenges for accountability and efficacy. They also raise questions about how existing distributions of power both constrain and enable organizational experimentation. COR contributes to the development of organization theory by connecting scholars from many disciplines who bring their knowledge and methods to a common understanding of these issues.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT COLLOQUIUM
Loyola Marymount University
Academic Affairs/College of Business Administration/Management
Host: Jone Pearce
Monday June 1st, 2015
3:30pm-5:00pm (reception to follow)
(Lyman Porter Colloquia Room)
Overqualification: An asset or liability in hiring decisions?
Does excess education or experience hinder an applicants selection for a job interview? Depending upon the theoretical perspective adopted, possessing education or experience beyond a jobs requirements (over-qualification) can be perceived either as an asset or liability. The person-job fit literature suggests that overqualified applicants will be selected less often that those who exactly match the job requirements. In contrast, human capital theory predicts that overqualified applicants will be selected as often as those who are exactly qualified. In this colloquium presentation, I will provide an overview of three studies where my colleagues and I examine how perceived over-qualification affects selection decisions. In Study 1 (Martinez, Lengnick-Hall & Kulkarni, 2014) we propose a conceptual model for conducting research on how Human Resource and hiring managers form impressions of overqualified individuals and how these impressions affect selection decisions. In Study 2 (Kulkarni, Lengnick-Hall & Martinez, 2014), based on a qualitative interview data analysis, we found that in most cases, managers are willing to interview and hire individuals whose education or experience exceeds a jobs requirements. Additionally, we propose a typology for categorizing applicant qualification levels and how these relate to human resource outcomes such as hiring decisions. Finally, In Study 3 (Martinez, Lengnick-Hall & Kulkarni, 2015), using a policy-capturing methodology, we simulated a resume screening process for interview selection. We found that possessing more related education or more related experience than required for a job does not lower the chances of obtaining an interview.
You are cordially invited to attend the COR End-of-Year Celebration and Small Grant Recipients’ Poster Presentations.
Date: Friday, May 29, 2015
Venue: SBSG 1321
Featuring the research by:
- Prof. Miriam Bender (Nursing)
- Santina Contreras (Social Ecology)
- Paula Hao (Merage)
- Victoria Lowerson (Social Ecology)
- Prof. Francesca Polletta and Katt Hoban (Social Sciences)
- Prof. Evan Schofer (Social Sciences)
- Dakuo Wang (ICS)
Lunch will be provided. Please RSVP to email@example.com by Monday, May 25.
A talk of interest to COR members….
Monday, April 27, 2015
Faculty host: Chris Bauman
Assistant Professor of Management
A. Gary Anderson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
School of Business Administration
University of California, Riverside
Information Aggregation in Organizations
One of the most basic requirements of successful organizations is their ability to extract information from their workforce, despite the presence of ex-ante private information and vested interests on part of the employees. In this talk, I will discuss some recent findings on how hierarchies affect information flows (Reitzig & Maciejovsky, 2015) and show that strategic information revelation is a function of organizational structure (Klapper, Maciejovsky, Puranam, & Reitzig, 2015). Finally, I will discuss some recent empirical findings (Maciejovsky & Budescu, in preparation), comparing the different information aggregation institutions of groups and markets with respect to their ability of withstanding explicit manipulation attempts.
You are invited to join us for the Spring quarter COR Faculty Workshop…
Graeme Boushey, Political Science, UCI
Discussants: Amihai Glazer (Social Sciences) and Philip Bromiley (Merage)
Date: Friday, April 24, 2015
Venue: SGSB 1321
Lunch will be provided. Please RSVP by Friday, April 17 to firstname.lastname@example.org.
Title: Experts, Amateurs, and Bureaucratic Influence in the American States
Abstract: This paper explores the growing policy influence of administrative agencies in U.S state politics. Drawing upon a large data set of proposed and adopted regulations issued by state governments from 1990 through 2010, we explore whether eroding policy expertise of state representatives has resulted in increased bureaucratic participation in the policy process, as amateur politicians rely more heavily on professionalized executive agencies to define problems and develop solutions. Specifically, we argue that as the gap between executive and legislative compensation increases in a state, the legislature both delegates and abdicates more, leading to increased policymaking volume by the state bureaucracy. We find robust evidence for such a relationship and illustrate the importance for this finding in the context of recent and recurring debates concerning institutional reform.